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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This appeal presents a question that appears to be an issue of first impression in
Idaho. Ms. Baker was convicted, following a conditional plea of guilty, of one count of
possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c).
Ms. Baker was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of
marijuana after she tested positive for these two substances. Ms. Baker asserts that
she cannot be convicted for "possessing" controlled substances where the substances
were found only in her body.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 26, 2011, Megan Baker gave birth to a baby girl, S.B., in Weiser,
ldaho. 1 (State's Exhibit 1, p.3; R., p.52.) After S.B. was born, Ms. Baker's urine tested
positive for THC. 2 (State's Exhibit 1, pp.6-7; R., p.39, 52.) During a well check visit by

Ms. Baker waived her preliminary hearing, and the only evidence presented during the
hearing on Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss were 35 pages consisting of the medical
records of Ms. Baker and S.B. (State's Exhibit 1.) Both parties apparently were in
agreement as to the facts, including that Ms. Baker admitted to using methamphetamine
12 days before S.B. was born and that she tested positive for methamphetamine and
THC several weeks after S.B.'s birth, on January 10, 2012, although there is no
evidence in the record supporting these facts nor was there a formal stipulation by the
parties. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the appellant will rely on the briefing for
the motion to dismiss and representations of the parties made during the hearing to
establish the facts of the case.
2 The record is not clear whether Ms. Baker's urine tested positive for the substance
tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC"), the active compound in marijuana, or whether it tested
positive for "Carboxy-THC," a commonly found marijuana metabolite that is not a drug
or intoxicating substance. See Reisenauer v. State, Dep't of Transp., 145 Idaho 948,
950-951 (2008). As Ms. Baker's trial counsel identified the substance found in her urine
only as "THC," Ms. Baker does not challenge the legality of the substance found in her
blood pursuant to State v. Stark, No. 39885, 2013 WL 1338841(Ct. App. April 4, 2013),
pet. for rev. granted (Idaho July 5, 2013).
1

1

the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare approximately two weeks later, on
January 10, 2012, Ms. Baker was questioned about her drug use, and provided a
sample to be tested for illegal drugs. (R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-21.) When
interviewed, Ms. Baker admitted to officers that she would test positive for marijuana
and that she had used methamphetamine twelve days before S.B. was born.
(R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, 13-22.) The sample Ms. Baker provided was positive for
amphetamines, methamphetamines and THC. (R., p.40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-21.)
On April 16, 2012, the State charged Ms. Baker with one count of felony
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, and one
count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana. (R., pp.27-28.)
Ms. Baker waived her preliminary hearing and the committing magistrate judge bound
Ms. Baker over to answer to the charge in district court. (R., pp.25-26.) The State filed
a Part II enhancement for a second offense under the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act as Ms. Baker had a previous conviction, nine years prior, for delivery of a controlled
substance. (R., pp.33-34.)
Counsel for Ms. Baker filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.39-41.) Ms. Baker argued that the mere
presence of a controlled substance in her system coupled with a vague admission
cannot amount to a sufficient legal basis to uphold a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. (R., pp.39-41.)

Ms. Baker asked the district court to adopt the

majority rule in other states that the mere presence of a controlled substance in a
person's body does not constitute possession within the meaning of the criminal
possession of controlled substance statutes.

(R., p.40.) Ms. Baker asserted that a

defendant must have the power and intention to control a substance in order to be guilty

2

of possession of a controlled substance, therefore, once a substance has been
consumed, there is no longer any power or any intent to control it. (10/1/12 Tr., p.7,
Ls.11-20.)
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court denied Ms. Baker's
motion to dismiss. (R., p.59; 10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.)

In denying the motion, the

district court stated:
Well, although the Dickens character Mr. Bumble said in response to
being informed that he is legally required to have control of his wife, that
the law is as - the law doesn't need to be - the law is not required to be
illogical or completely lacking in common sense. It sometimes achieves
that end, but I think that reason and commonsense should rule the day,
and I can't think of a more intense way to possess drugs than to have it
inside your body so that you can test positive for it, so I'm denying the
motion to dismiss.
(10/1/12 Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.5.) The district court also noted that "I think the rule of
reason should apply, and if others choose to be irrational, illogical, and lacking
commonsense, I leave that to them. The motion is denied." (10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9.)
Ms. Baker entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony possession of
a controlled substance, preserving her right to challenge the district court's denial of her
motion to dismiss on appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
misdemeanor possession charge and to limit its recommendation to an underlying
sentence of seven years unified, with three years fixed, and to recommend probation,
with a period of time in county jail.

(R., pp.60-67, 69-70; 10/15/12 Tr., p.11, L.24 -

p.13, L.17.) The district court accepted Ms. Baker's plea and ordered a substance
abuse evaluation, a mental health evaluation and a Presentence Investigation

(hereinafter, PSI). (10/15/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-23.) The district court imposed a unified
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Baker
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for a period of up to 365 days. (R., pp.72-73; 12/3/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.5-8.) Ms. Baker filed
a timely prose Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.75-79.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Baker's Motion To Dismiss The State's
Information Due To A Lack Of Evidence To Support The Offense Charged

A.

Introduction
Ms. Baker asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss

the State's information as a charge of possession of a controlled substance cannot be
proved based on a positive urinalysis combined with a defendant's admissions to past
use.

Specifically, the State failed to establish that Ms. Baker possessed the two

controlled substances found in her body within the meaning of I.C. § 37-2732(c).

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Baker's Motion To Dismiss
Ms. Baker filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 48(a)(2),

which provides:
The court, on notice to all parties may dismiss a criminal action upon its
own motion or upon motion of any party upon either of the following
grounds:

(2) For any other reason, the court concludes that such dismissal will
serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's
business.
I.C.R. 48(a). "On its face, I.C.R. 48(a)(2) has two requirements: (1) that dismissal serve
'the ends of justice,' and (2) that dismissal serve 'the effective administration of the
court's business."' State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781 (1999).
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de
nova. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid
6

treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v.

Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v.
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the statute is not ambiguous, the
appellate court is to give effect to the plain meanings of the terms in the statute.

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011).

However,

should the Court find that the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that
ambiguity to be resolved in Ms. Baker's favor. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho
99, 103 (2008).
In this case, there was insufficient evidence to support a charge of possession of
a controlled substance under I.C. § 37-2732(c). The State alleged that Ms. Baker was
in possession of controlled substances, methamphetamine and marijuana, because
these substances were detected in her urine on January 10, 2012, and she admitted
that she had used methamphetamine nearly a month earlier. (R., pp.52-53.) The State
charged Ms. Baker with one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and one
count of felony possession of controlled substances pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(c).
(R., pp.27-28.) The relevant portion of this statutory provision provides that:
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c).
The "possession" language of I.C. § 37-2732(c), when applied to whether a
person can "possess" a controlled substance when the substance is only found in the
individual's blood or urine has not previously been interpreted by any Idaho appellate
court and is therefore an issue of first impression. Construction and application of
statutes are purely legal questions, and therefore reviewing courts exercise free
7

review. McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332 (2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130
Idaho 420 (1997). "The language of the statute has to be given its plain, obvious, and
rational meaning." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). "Where the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646
(Ct. App. 2001 ).
Ms. Baker does not contest that she tested positive for both methamphetamine
and THC. What Ms. Baker does challenge is that the district court's conclusion that
because methamphetamine and THC were detected in her urine and she told law
enforcement that she used methamphetamine within the past month, she "possessed"
controlled substances in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c).

1.

The Plain Language Of I.C. § 37-2732(c) Is Not Ambiguous

The State could not prove that Ms. Baker "possessed" the methamphetamine
and marijuana detected in her body.
Once a substance enters a person's body, that person no longer has the ability to
control the substance.

See State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 211 (Kan. 1983);

People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hornaday, 713
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986); State v. Da/ine, 30 P.3d 426, 430 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).

In

Flinchpaugh, the defendant moved to dismiss after the magistrate found probable cause
at a preliminary hearing. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the State
appealed. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 209. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the
district court's decision, holding that evidence of a controlled substance in the
defendant's blood did not establish possession of the substance; nor was it adequate
circumstantial evidence to show prior possession by the defendant, since the drug could
8

have been injected involuntarily or introduced by artifice. The Kansas Supreme Court
found that once a controlled substance is in a person's blood, the power of that person
to control, 3 possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end, and thus evidence of
a controlled substance after it has been introduced into a person's blood does not
establish possession of that substance. Id. 659 P.2d at 211.
Because that language of a statute must be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning, "possess" is defined as "[t]o have in one's actual control; to have possession
of."

Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

Further, "control" is given the ordinary

meaning of the word, that is, "[t]o exercise power or influence over."
Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

Black's Law

Ms. Baker did not have possession or control over the

substances detected in her urine.
Both actual possession (physical control over an item) and constructive
possession (knowingly having control over the item) require the defendant have the
ability to exercise control over the substance. See State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644,
646 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that jury instruction defining actual possession as requiring
"that a person have direct physical control over a thing" and defining constructive
possession as requiring "that a person knowingly have the right of control over a thing"
fairly and accurately reflected the applicable law); see also State v. Silva, 134 Idaho
848, 855 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that instructions mirrored those given in Rozajewski
and, therefore, were not erroneous).
Here, once Ms. Baker ingested the substances, she ceased to have possession
or control over the substances that had been assimilated into her body. Because the

3

The Supreme Court in Flinchpaugh also examined the ordinary meaning of "control",
finding it meant "to exercise restraining or directing influence over." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
9

State would be unable to prove that Ms. Baker physically possessed or controlled the
contents of her urine, 4 it would be unable to establish the element of "possession" and
the ends of justice required the district court to dismiss the charges.

I.C.R. 48(a)(2).

Thus, the district court erred in denying Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss.

2.

District Court Erred By Not Reading The Statutes Prohibiting
Use/Consumption Versus Those Prohibiting Possession In Pari Materia

The Supreme Court construes statutes under the assumption that the legislature
knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was
passed. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999).

Further, "It is a fundamental law

of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed
together, to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect." Id. at 689-90 (citation
omitted). The well established rule of in pari materia is as follows:
The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means
that each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the
same matter or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to
the same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one
system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be
inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by
one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious
in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the
intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and
so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation.

While this Appellant's Brief contains a discussion regarding the inability of an
individual to possess the substances found in one's urine, appellant does not maintain
that an individual can never possess a substance inside his/her body within the
meaning of the controlled substances statute. C.f State v. Rudd, 856 P.2d 699 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant
possessed controlled substances where defendant ingested receptacle containing
controlled substances and contents were not assimilated, but rather were still within the
dominion and control of the defendant as receptacle could be retrieved or expelled from
the body).
4
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Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808, 811 (1982) (internal citations
omitted.)
The Idaho legislature chose to make illegal simply the presence of a controlled
substance in an individual's blood. In 1996, the Idaho Legislature criminalized the "use"
of controlled substances under I.C. § 37-2732C:
"[i]t is unlawful for any person ... to use or be under the influence of any
controlled substance specified [herein], except when administered by or
under the direction of a person licensed by the state to dispense,
prescribe, or administer controlled substances.
I.C. § 37-2732C(a).
This statute proscribes very different conduct than I.C. § 37-2732(c), depending
entirely on whether the defendant is found to have "possessed" a controlled substance
or merely to have "used" one. Whereas a finding of "possession" is a felony, and upon
conviction, the defendant may be imprisoned for up to seven years or fined up to
$15,000, or both, a finding of "use" is only a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum
fine of $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months.
Statutes that are in pari materia, i.e., relating to the same subject, should be
construed harmoniously, if possible, so as to further the legislative intent. State v.

Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 2010).
Here, the consumption/use statute and the possession statute are codified within
the same act, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and both serve to regulate
controlled substances, thus reading them in pari materia is appropriate. See State v.

Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367 (1983) (holding that where both statutes dealt with the
same subject matter, i.e., sentencing procedures, the Idaho Supreme Court was
enjoined to compare and harmonize them).

11

Further, because the legislature has specifically enacted separate legislation to
punish those individuals who have been using or observed as being under the influence
of a controlled substance, this Court should find that "use" should not metamorphose
into "possession."

See I.C. § 37-2732C.

The legislature enacted a "use" statute to

provide criminal sanctions against an individual using or suspected of being under the
influence of a controlled substance. The legislature, by its separate categorization and
punishment of the offenses, has concluded that these are separate offenses, with
separate elements. 5 To find otherwise would negate the existence of I.C. § 37-2732C
prohibiting "use" of controlled substances.
Moreover, the legislature knew how to craft statutes where a defendant violates
the law by having a specific amount of the substance in his/her blood, for example, the
statue prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating
substances states:
(1 )(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or any other intoxicating substances. . . or who as an alcohol
concentration of 0.08, ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood,
urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
within this state.

I.C. § 18-8004.
The legislature could have easily written I.C. § 37-2732(c) to say "possess, or be
under the influence of a controlled substance" to encompass those with a controlled
substance in their blood or urine.

Under such a set of circumstances, it would have

been apparent the legislature was attempting to make it illegal to have a controlled
substance inside a person's body. Instead, I.C. § 37-2732(c) provides:

Separate statutes criminalizing possession and use/being under the influence have
also been enacted in numerous other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Spann, Cal.App.3d at
408; State v. Downes, 572 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
5

12

It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c).

The statute is devoid of any reference to blood analysis or

. language such as "under the influence," similar to what is set forth in I.C. § 18-8004,
further indicating that the legislature did not intend to include those individuals with
controlled substances in their blood within the scope of the possession statute.
Further, the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act provides that "drug
addicts may not be subjected to criminal prosecution or incarceration solely because of
their ... addiction to drugs." I.C. § 39-301. I.C. § 39-310 provides:
(1) With the exception of persons below the statutory age for consuming
alcoholic beverages and of persons affected by the provisions of
subsection (3) herein, no person shall be incarcerated or prosecuted
criminally or civilly for the violation of any law, ordinance, resolution or rule
that includes drinking, being a common drunkard, or being found in an
intoxicated or addicted condition as one of the elements of the offense
giving rise to criminal or civil penalty or sanction.

(3) Nothing in this chapter shall affect any law, ordinance, resolution, or
rule against drunken driving, driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or other similar offense involving the operation of a vehicle, aircraft,
boat, machinery, or other equipment, or regarding the sale, purchase,
dispensing, possessing, or use of alcoholic beverages or drugs at stated
times and places or by a particular class of persons, or regarding the
carrying of a concealed weapon when intoxicated or under the influence of
an intoxicating drink or drug, or regarding pedestrians who are under the
influence of alcohol or drugs to a degree which renders them a hazard and
who walk or are otherwise upon a highway except on a sidewalk, or
regarding persons who are using or are under the influence of controlled
substances or narcotic drugs and who are on public property, roadways or
conveyances or on private property open to the public.

(5) Nothing in this chapter shall affect the enforcement of any other
provisions of the uniform controlled substances act.

13

Idaho Code § 39-310 (emphasis added). The Act eliminated the status offense of drug
addiction in that it "establishes a system for the evaluation and treatment of alcoholics
[and drug addicts] outside of prison facilities, and provides that intoxicated persons will
not be subjected to criminal prosecution or incarceration solely because of their
consumption of alcohol [or drugs]." State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 732 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act eliminates the status
offense of alcoholism and provides a mechanism for treatment, but it does not impose a
requirement to provide treatment for alcoholics convicted of substantive crimes). Thus,
the criminalization of drug addiction by prosecuting an individual found to have
controlled substances in their urine seems contrary to the intent of the legislature in
enacting the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, and actually appears to
directly contravene the provisions of the Act. 6
Additionally, should this Court find that testing positive for a controlled substance
is a crime, this would constitute a continuing violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c), such that an
individual could be prosecuted for each day a positive test result was obtained. Further,
it is anticipated that the State would have great difficulty establishing that the individual
actually ingested the controlled substance(s) while within the State of Idaho, thus
problems establishing the proper venue would likely arise.

6

Further, such an interpretation would undoubtedly violate the United States
Constitution, as the United States Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California that a
statute making it a criminal offense for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics
inflicted a "cruel and unusual punishment," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

14

3.

District Court Abandoned Proper Legal Analysis

At the hearing on Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss, the district court prefaced its
holding by stating that "the law is -- as the law doesn't need to be," thereby indicating
the district court's intent to rule in nonconformity with established law. (10/1/12 Tr., p.9,
Ls.22-23.) The district court further stated that it was disregarding the status of the law
and decisions by others, and denied the motion, finding that it "c[ouldn]'t think of a more
intense way to possess drugs than to have it inside your body so that you can test
positive for it." (10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-5.) The district court noted that it was applying
the "rule of reason" in denying the motion. (10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) The district court
thereby chose not to follow the principles of statutory construction and abdicated any
reliance on established legal precedent in denying the motion.

It appeared that the

district court chose not to rely on legal authority and/or precedent, and instead set forth
its "common sense" line of reasoning when interpreting the meaning of the possession
statute and its application to the facts of this case.
Idaho appellate courts have not previously addressed this question in light of the
specific set of facts presented in this case. As referred to by Ms. Baker's trial counsel,
the law regarding "possession" in other states may be informative. In People v. Spann,
the California Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that possession of a controlled
substance may be proven by its use, finding that after consumption the user no longer
has dominion and control over the substance consumed and hence does not possess it
"We agree for the obvious reason that a person is not in control of a substance that is
en route through his digestive system." People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986); see also Evans v. State, 132 So. 601 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) (prohibition
era case holding that whisky was not "possessed" when it "is in the man" after
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consumption); State v. Downes, 52 P .2d 1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (phencyclidine
(PCP) is not possessed by the user after it has been injected into his arm).
The majority rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that the mere presence of a
controlled substance in an individual's body does not constitute possession within the
meaning of criminal statutes. See State v. Vorm, 570 N.E. 2d 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the mere presence of a controlled substance in blood or urine is
circumstantial evidence of prior possession, but insufficient to sustain a conviction
without additional corroborating evidence); State v. Lewis, 394 N.W. 2d 212 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the usual and ordinary meaning of the term possession
does not include substances injected into the body and assimilated into the system);
State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) ("Once a narcotic is injected into the vein,

or swallowed orally, it is no longer in the individual's control for purposes of
possession.")7; State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983) (concluding that once a
controlled substance is within a person's system the power of the person to control
possess use dispose of or cause harm is at an end); State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941
(Alaska App. 1991) (holding that defendant could not be convicted of possession of
cocaine "in his body").
Accordingly, this Court should hold that the district court erred in denying
Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss because an individual does not "possess" a controlled

7

The statute regulating controlled substance in Washington is substantively similar to
the Idaho statute at issue in this case. See RCW 69.50.4013(1) (" It is unlawful for any
person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly
from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his or her professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this
chapter.")
16

substance within the meaning of I.C. S 37-2732(c) when the controlled substance is
found only in an individual's body.

4.

Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute,
Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of
Ms. Baker

If this Court finds that I.C. § 37-2732(c) is ambiguous with regard to the
"possession" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of
Ms. Baker. "It is well-settled that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly and in
favor of the defendant."

State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996).

"[A]mbiguity

concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." United
States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398,402 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401

U.S. 808, 811 (1971)). The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for
interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court
stated:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the

premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute.
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The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect Ms. Baker's
due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Accordingly
as is articulated herein, in order to show that Ms.

Baker "possessed" the

methamphetamine and THC within the meaning of I.C. § 37-2732(c), the State was
required to show that Ms. Baker possessed-exercised dominion and control over-the
methamphetamine and THC found in her system. Because the State had insufficient
evidence to convict Ms. Baker of possession of controlled substances, the district
court's order denying her motion to dismiss should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Baker respectfully requests that this Court vacate Ms. Baker's conviction and
remand this case to the district court with an order that the district court grant
Ms. Baker's Motion To Dismiss.
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2013.
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I
SALLyr . C OLEY
)
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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